Annex "A," Subparagraph 1d, Sociological Background

ETHNIC GROUPS

•563 Ethnic minorities are herein defined as groups bound together by common ties of race, nationality, or culture, living together within an alien civilization but remaining culturally distinct. The Chinese Communists, following the practice of the USSR, have termed the ethnic minorities within the Chinese territory "nationalities" "national minorities," or "minority nationalities" in juxtaposition to the Han nationality. Therefore, the term "nationality" as used in China today is a designation for an ethnic and geographical community. Owing to the fact that the Hui people, neither racially homogeneous nor concentrated in one area, are also regarded as a separate nationality by the Chinese Communists, the reason for such a classifications seems to be the presence of customary laws and practices peculiar to a group of common origin which have, over a period of time, regulated its standard of behavior and given rise to group consciousness and distinctive characteristics. It is on this same broad principle that we base our classification of the ethnic groups of China. Accordingly, the Han Chinese, though by far the great majority of the Chinese population (94%), are also considered as one of the many ethnic groups in China.

I. INTRODUCTION

16[a] East China is populated predominantly by Han Chinese who came from North China, especially during the periods 265-618 and 906-1280 A.D., when North China was invaded by the northern tribes.[1] Since 617, official Chinese histories have not

1. Li Chi, The Formation of the Chinese People, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1928, pp. 165-166, 237.

162 Yao people mentioned in Chinese historical
144 records, and are related to the Yao people in Kwangsi. Today, these remaining aborigines are called She Yao, Hsia, or more commonly, She.

162 The total She population is now estimated at 200,000. The great majority are found in Fukien particularly in the Wu-i mountain region of Chien-ning and Ch'ang-ting districts. Only about 44,000 are at present living in the southern section of the Kuo-ts'ang mountain chains near Li-shui in Chekiang Province.[8] Lan, Lei, Chung, and P'an are the four surnames of the She people; intermarriage is approved only
241 among families bearing these names.[9] They are poor slash-and-burn farming folks like the Miao and Yao in South China. (This type of agriculture entails burning off the natural vegetation on the mountain slopes to enrich the soil for planting; but the fertility of the soil is exhausted after two to four years, and the farmer
197 must move on.) Those who work for the Han landlords usually speak the local Chinese dialects.[10]

• 563 Regionally as well as nationally, the She people are still as much neglected by the Communist administration as they were during

---

7. The Yao people of Chekiang and Fukien fled to remote mountain regions after the Yao suppression campaign of Wang Shou-jen during the Ming dynasty. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

563 previous regimes. When the People's Government celebrates its national holidays in Peking, no She representatives are present. Nor are the She people mentioned in the activities of minority ethnic groups in East China.[11] This could mean either that successful She individuals are weaned away by the prevailing Han Chinese culture and lose their identity as She or that among the She people there are not enough leaders to claim a separate identity.

B. The Hui of Shantung.

162 In East China the Hui people can be found in cities like Shanghai, Nanking, and Ch'ien-chou (in Fukien); but most of them are found in the province of Shantung.[12]

563 Like the Hui people elsewhere in China, the Hui in Shantung trace their descent from Arabian and Iranian soldiers and merchants who moved into China from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries and who intermarried with the Han Chinese, and from Han Chinese children adopted by Hui families. Today, the Hui people in general continue to intermarry with the Han Chinese. However, when a Han Chinese wishes to marry a Hui woman, he must embrace Islam, whereas a Han woman who wishes to marry a Hui man need not change her religion.

---

11. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, September 30, 1950; October 23, 1950.

12. There are many Moslem peoples in China of which the Hui is one. Other Moslem peoples include the Uigurs, Kazaks, Mongol Moslems, and Tibetan Moslems. →

563 Although different ancestry sets apart the Hui people from the Han Chinese, lack of racial prejudice on the part of the Hui facilitates the assimilation of Han Chinese into the Hui community and renders the racial composition of the Hui more or less similar to that of the Han Chinese around them. The cohesiveness of the Hui people in East China is attributable to factors other than racial and physical similar-
[771] ity. Their religion (Islam, called Hui Chiao or Ch'ing-chen Chiao), language (Chinese, supplemented by Iranian and Arabic elements of a religious nature), and customs which stem from religious practices and observances make them cohesive as an ethnic group in spite of outside cultural forces and the fact that in Shantung the Hui generally do not have large and
[162] contiguous communities. Most of the Hui people in Shantung live in Lin-ch'ing, Chi-ning, Chou-13 ch'eng, P'eng-lai, and cities along the railways.

The Kuomintang Government seemed to take for granted that the Hui people were sufficiently assimilated into Han Chinese communities and did not merit recognition as a separate ethnic group. In the 1930's the Hui were treated merely as "believers in Islam," and their ethnic difference was minimized. The present Communist government has reversed the Kuomintang

---

There are about 3.5 million Hui people in China. Information on the numerical strength of the Hui people in East China is not yet available.

13. Huang Tse-ts'ang, Shantung, Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chü, 1935, pp. 99-100.

•563 practice. By emphasizing past grievances under previous regimes between the Han and the Hui in Northwest China (where there are large concentrations of Hui population), the People's Government claims that its policy toward the Hui people in all parts of China is the most enlightened of all times. The Communists, now anxious to foster a better working relationship between the Han and Hui in Shantung, have probably exaggerated the role played by the Hui people in the Shantung Liberated Area and in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government during the last war against Japan. As early as January 1950, the Commission on Nationalities at Peking sent Liu Ke-p'ing, one of its deputy chairmen who claims to be of Hui origin, on an inspection tour around Tsinan, Shantung, in order to familiarize the government with the econmic activities and educational conditions of the Hui people in Shantung.[14] So far we have not been able to appraise the result of the Communist effort.

563 463 Traditionally, the Hui people are merchants, handicraftsmen, inn-keepers, and restaurant operators; the Hui people in Shantung are said to prefer earning their living in their accustomed way rather than by farming evenwhen offered land to till after the land reform. The Communists may have achieved some initial success in diverting some Hui people into agriculture, since at least 49 agricultural mutual-aid teams under Communist cadres have been organized among the Hui people in Shantung.[15]

14. People's Daily, January 22, 1950.
15. People's Daily, April 28, 1954.

563 According to a report at a meeting held by the Hui Cultural Association at Peking, ten autonomous hsien and chou have been established for the Hui people in China.[16] The scattered Hui communities in different parts of Shantung have their representatives in local governments under the present Communist regime. There are indications, however, that the Hui people in Li-ch'eng, Shantung, probably have their own government.[17] If this is the case, Li-ch'eng's autonomous government would be the only one of its kind outside Northwest China and Inner Mongolia.

C. The Tan People in Fukien

563 162 A Communist publication lists the Tan people as one of the minority nationalities in Fukien. The Tan people are boatmen on the lower Min River, near Foochow. In physical appearance they are indistinguishable from the rest of the Fukienese population.[18] Their numerical strength is unknown.

IV. POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMUNISTS

563 657 Communist cadres working among ethnic minorities elsewhere in China are cautioned against exhibiting Han Chinese chauvinism in order not to arouse the "narrow nationalism" of ethnic minorities; in East China, no such caution has so far been voiced. Communist ethnic

16. NCNA, April 15, 1955, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1031, April 20, 1955, Hong Kong American Consulate Gen'l, pp. 32-33.

17. People's Daily, April 28, 1954.

18. Ch'u Shao-t'ang, Hsin Chung-kuo Ti-li [Geography of New China], Shanghai, Ta-chung t'u-shu chü, 1953, pp. 159-160.

•563 policies elsewhere in China emphasize "winning the leaders of ethnic minorities who are influ-
657 ential among their own peoples"; in East China no such leaders have been found. Unlike the ethnic minorities in the Southwest, who may look to Tibet or to countries across the border for cultural and political leadership, and unlike the ethnic minorities in South China, who are so scattered that their acute social and economic problems take inter-ethnic group forms, the ethnic minorities in East China are apparently docile and contented residents and do not constitute a problem for the Communist administration. These minorities could be weaned away by the surrounding Han Chinese culture, and the Communists see no need for treating these minorities separately by awakening them politically, building up their minority economy, or reviving minority languages and folklore. The gradual assimilation of minorities is not a Communist achievement, but the Communists prefer to say that it is the result of a program of "equality for all nationalities."

The Hui people in East China are accorded some special attention by the Communists. It is clear that this is not due to their numerical strength in Shantung but to their significance in the national scene. The recent activities of the Islamic Association in Peking and the Communist government's emphasis on the Islamic aspects of the Hui people's activities indicate that the Communists intend to make use of the Hui people in order that other Moslem peoples in China may be brought closer to Peking.[19]

19. People's Daily, September 27, 1952.

1:Stanford U.S-4, 5 1956 AF 15 East China
~~AF 15~~ AF15

563
L57

The lack of significant content in ethnic policy and administration in the region has forced the Communists to publicize the activities of ethnic minorities there whenever possible, as illustrations of progress and political enlightenment under Communist leadership. The Communist Party newspapers blatantly publicized the fact that 470,000 minority nationals, among a total of 90,000,000 voters in this region, exercised their "democratic political right" in the popular election of 1954, and that many people so elected were of non-Han origin.[20]

In Shanghai, a number of people who are publicized as "minority residents" welcome and entertain visitors from ethnic groups in other parts of China and delegations from other countries. Their names are frequently found in newspaper headlines and their photographs are displayed on magazine covers.[21] In fact, these people look like devotees of a political cause who express their political convictions. Since their relationships with their own ethnic groups are artificially fostered and modulated by the Communist government, they are not representatives of ethnic minorities.

Although the small number of minority nationals in East China do not present the Communist administration with serious minority problems, their presence provides a ready instrument for propaganda depicting equality and fraternity among ethnic groups in China. Most of the propaganda has no immediate bearing on

---

20. Ibid, April 28, 1954.

21. Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, May 5, 1952; January 5, 1953.

1:Stanford U.S-4, 5 1956 AF 15 East China
~~AF 15~~ AF15

•563
657

the welfare of the ethnic groups involved.

There is, however, one unique feature of the ethnic policy of Communist China which stems from the present political situation between the Chinese Mainland and the island of Formosa. The latter is regarded by the Communists as a province of East China lost to Chiang Kai-shek. Hence Communist China claims to be the fatherland of the 160,000 aborigines, the Kao-shan people, in the eastern part of the island. The Communists have gathered together a number of "representatives of the Kao-shan people" to sit in Peking among the delegates from other ethnic minorities and make speeches advocating the "recovery" of Formosa.

---

22. People's Daily, July 13, 1952.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 15 East China
~~AF 15~~ AF15

575 A Communist release on June 16, 1955, indicated that the I-kuan Tao was still a disciplined and resourceful organization, at least in the Kalgan region.[42]

IV. MOHAMMEDANISM

779 This religion was introduced into China, not by missionaries but by immigrants arriving overland from the west and northwest and by sea to Canton; they have since spread until there are some in every province, although the highest concentration is the northwest and southwest. Since their ancestors were immigrants, the Mohammedans have been treated by Chinese governments as both an ethnic minority and a religious group. (Hence, cf. the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Adherents have tended to live in separate communities, their mores and customs by religious law rather than by the laws and customs of China. Not only did Islam prescribe for the believer a different way of life from that of the Chinese, it also had international connections and a tradition of militancy. These aspects of Mohammedanism made their communities in China the object of government distruct, and governments in modern times have alternated between policies of suppression and of appeasement.

779 563 The Chinese Mohammedan is set apart from other Chinese by such special customs and observances as these: many greetings are exchanged in Arabic or Persian; believers wear

42. SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

779 563 white headdresses resembling turbans; they abstain from alcohol and pork; marriage and funeral rites are different from the Chinese, e.g., they do not use coffins in burial. Traditionally, they seldom engage in farming but rather in certain occupations which in some areas they virtually monopolize -- keeping inns and organizing caravans, butchering, leather working, metal-work, or managing shops which deal in curios and jewelry. Because of oppression and a strong sense of religious community, they tend to live in special districts or streets. They have been more inclined towards athletics and military careers than the Chinese.[43]

779 794 The Moslem sector of a city or the Moslem village community centers on its mosque presided over by its Imam, usually elected from among senior leaders; the Imam and the elders invite an Ahung who preaches, settles disputes, interprets Islamic law, and presides at ceremonies.[44] The Ahung is usually versed in Arabic, although until very recently few had any direct contact with major centers of Islam in the Near East.

779 In the East China Region, Mohammedan communities are found in all provinces. But the major centers, now recognized by the Communists as "Autonomous Areas," lie in the Southwest, the Northwest, and in Central Asia. The

43. Chan, op. cit., p. 6; Encyclopedia of China Problems, pp. 421-22.

44. Chan, op. cit., p. 189; Encyclopedia of China Problems.

562 women to the new regime; older women who had
184 learned to live in peace with the extended family system are likely to dread the Communist effort to reduce the extended family to the conjugal family; younger women are more apt to feel favorably disposed toward the Peking regime.

A sharp difference in attitude is to be observed between the women in Kiangsu (particularly in such larger cities as Shanghai and Nanking) and those in the more remote districts in Fukien. City life had caused changes in attitudes among women in Shanghai even before the Communists announced their policy with regard to women and their status in society. Most of the women in western Fukien villages remain more strictly tradition-bound and are less prepared to accept the ideas introduced by the Peking government.

VI. NATIONAL MINORITIES

•563 A larger degree of assimilation of minority
184 nationalities is observed in East China than in Southwest or Central-South China. Hence there are fewer distinguishing features of the attitudes of minority nationalities in this region. Generally speaking, the minority groups in China have never felt any great loyalty toward the larger political entity of China. The Communist policy is to cultivate a feeling of kinship between these groups and the Han-Chinese. To substantiate this policy, the government has been trying to develop for

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
~~AF15~~ AF15

563 the minority groups their own languages and to
184 provide these people with more educational opportunities. There is a persistent effort to publicize the achievement of individuals belonging to minority groups. While this may be nothing more than a propaganda device, its effect on scattered minority nationalities in such places as Chien-ning and Ch'ang-ting in western Fukien is not to be underestimated.

VII. OTHER GROUPS

184 In addition to the groups discussed, there
662 are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes do have significant bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibited intense feelings of patriotism and dedication to the "cause" in the early days of their careers. They are now working to strengthen the machine which brought them to power, thereby making certain that they will not be deposed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, there have been few signs of antagonism among the top leaders. A purge as violent as that which took place in